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INTRODUCTION 
“I did not altogether hate the life growing inside of me. Instead, 
I felt a sort of kinship, a partnership—perhaps the kind that only 
develops between those who have suffered together—but, 
nevertheless, I felt a bond.”1 These words come from a woman who 
was the victim of a rape that resulted in pregnancy.2 Like a number of 
women who become pregnant through rape, this woman rejected the 
notion that abortion and adoption were her only available options.3 
Instead, she made the difficult decision to keep and raise the baby 
conceived by her rape.4 
A substantial number of incidents of rape occur in the United 
States every year.5 According to data from the National Women’s 
Study, as many as 683,000 incidences of rape occur among adult 
women in the United States over the course of one year.6 Of these 
incidences, approximately 5% result in pregnancy. 7  Thus, 
approximately 32,101 pregnancies result from rape every year.8  
Society at large and many state legislatures commonly assume 
that women who become pregnant through rape will inevitably and 
automatically reject their pregnancies.9 Society assumes rape victims 
will view their babies as extensions of their rapists and reminders of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Shauna Prewitt, An Open Letter to Rep. Akin from a Woman Who Got 





5 See Facts About Sexual Assault, N.Y. CITY ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, listen.nycagainstrape.org/learn.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
6 Melisa M. Holmes, et al., Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and 
Descriptive Characteristics from a National Sample of Women, 175 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 320 (1996). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A Discussion 
and Analysis of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become 
Mothers Through Rape, 98 GEO. L.J. 827, 840-41 (2010). 
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the trauma associated with their rapes.10  Thus, the expected and 
socially appropriate courses of action are limited to abortion or 
adoption.11 In sharp contrast to these societal expectations, however, 
statistical studies demonstrate that a substantial number of women 
who become pregnant through rape do not choose to abort or put their 
babies up for adoption.12 Instead, they opt to keep and raise their 
babies.13 
In making the decision to keep their babies, however, these 
victim mothers face the possibility of psychologically painful and 
damaging prolonged contact with their rapists. In most states, rapist 
fathers enjoy the same parental rights as any other biological parent.14 
The existence of these parental rights means that the rapist father may 
seek physical custody, legal custody, or visitation with the child.15 If 
granted any of these rights, he is subsequently able to assert a 
significant level of control over the victim mother’s life through his 
control over the child’s life and upbringing.16 
Unfortunately, victim mothers are currently provided very little 
legal protection.17 While many states have legislation designed to 
make it easier for raped women to have abortions or put their babies 
up for adoption, only a small number of states have passed legislation 
specifically designed to restrict the rapist father’s parental rights when 
the victim mother decides to keep her baby.18 
Victims’ rights advocates have begun pushing state legislatures 
to pass laws that would restrict rapist fathers’ parental rights in these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Holmes, et al., supra note 6, at 320. 
13 Id. 
14 For the purposes of this Comment, I will refer to the biological fathers as 
rapist fathers and biological mothers as victim mothers even in instances where the 
father has not been prosecuted or convicted of sexual assault. 
15 See Kara N. Bitar, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL'Y 275, 276-77 (2012). 
16 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 831. 
17 Bitar, supra note 15, at 276. 
18 Id. 
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circumstances.19 Such legislation, however, faces the possibility of 
due process challenges since it seeks to limit the rapist father’s 
constitutionally protected right to a family.20 In order to avoid such 
challenges, this legislation must first, as a threshold issue, require the 
victim mother to establish that the rape did in fact occur and result in 
the pregnancy. Further, the evidentiary standard for establishing the 
fact of the rape must be clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer.21 
Additionally, since the Supreme Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska that 
the right to a family is a fundamental right,22 such legislation must 
stand up to strict scrutiny.23 Thus it must be shown that there is a 
compelling state interest,24  the legislation is narrowly tailored to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Skadden Associate Tells of Her Rape and 
Pregnancy in Open Letter to Todd Akin, ABA J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 11:37 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/skadden_associate_tells_of_her_rape_and_
pregnancy_in_open_letter_to_todd_ak/. 
20 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“The problem for 
our determination is whether the statute as construed and applied unreasonably 
infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth 
Amendment: ‘No state…shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law.’” (quoting Const. Amend. XIV)). 
21 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (“Before a State may sever completely and 
irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the 
State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”). 
22 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 
The problem for our determination is whether the statute as 
construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty 
guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
‘No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.’ While this court has not attempted to 
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has 
received much consideration and some of the included things have 
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes . . . the right of 
the individual to . . . bring up children. 
Id. 
23 Sweezy v. N.H. by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957). 
24 Id. (“For a citizen to be made to forego even apart of so basic a liberty as his 
political autonomy, the subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.”). 
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achieve that compelling interest,25 and the legislation is the least 
restrictive means for achieving the compelling interest.26 
In passing effective legislation aimed at restricting rapists’ 
parental rights, the primary strict scrutiny hurdle the legislation must 
overcome is the demonstration of a compelling state interest. The 
state interest in these cases is the best interests of the child, as well as 
the welfare of the victim mother. Legislation that seeks to restrict the 
parental rights of rapists must show that it is not in the best interests 
of the child for the rapist to have parental rights.27 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the prevalence of pregnancy 
resulting from rape, the scope of parental rights in the United States, 
and the damaging effects on victim mothers whose attackers seek to 
enforce their parental rights. Part II of this Comment will discuss case 
law, the current state of legislation, problems with the current 
legislation, and potential reasons for the absence of effective 
legislation. Part III of this Comment will discuss how future 
legislation can be designed to restrict rapist fathers’ parental rights 
without violating due process. 
I. LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO PROTECT WOMEN WHO KEEP THEIR 
BABIES CONCEIVED BY RAPE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE PROLONGED 
CONTACT WITH THEIR ATTACKERS IS DETRIMENTAL TO VICTIM 
MOTHERS 
 Multiple studies have shown that a significant portion of the 
approximately 32,101 women who get pregnant as a result of being 
raped each year decide to keep their babies.28 As one such study found, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
26 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
27 See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Validity of State Statute Providing for 
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 A.L.R. 4th 774 (1983). 
28 See, e.g., Holmes, et al., supra note 6, at 320; accord Prewitt, supra note 9, at 
829 (citing Amy Sobie & David C. Reardon, A Survey of Rape and Incest 
Pregnancies, in VICTIMS AND VICTORS: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT THEIR PREGNANCIES, 
ABORTIONS, AND CHILDREN RESULTING FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 18, 19 (David C. 
Reardon, et al. eds., 2000)). 
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of women who did not discover they were pregnant until the second 
trimester, 32.2% of women who became pregnant as a result of rape 
decided to keep their babies, while 50% underwent abortions and 
5.9% chose adoption.29 Another study found that 26% underwent 
abortion.30 Of the remaining 73% who did not choose abortion, 64% 
chose to keep their babies, and 36% opted for adoption.31 In the 
majority of these situations, the rapist fathers have the same parental 
rights to the child as any other biological father.32 Thus, these women 
face the possibility of prolonged contact with their attackers. If the 
attacker decides to pursue his parental rights, the victim mother will 
have to remain in contact with her rapist in order to coordinate 
custody or visitation. Such prolonged contact may have a damaging 
effect on both the woman and her child.33 
 There is very little legal protection for these women. Federal 
legislation as well as the legislative structure of many states is largely 
reflective of the incorrect assumption that all rape victims will only 
choose adoption or abortion. The federal government, for instance, 
provides funding for abortions for women who become pregnant 
through rape.34 Furthermore, many states have legislation designed to 
streamline the adoption process for rape victims by waiving the 
requirement that the rapist father approve the adoption before it can 
be finalized, making it easier for the victim mother to place the baby 
up for adoption. 35  Many states also require hospitals to offer 
emergency contraceptives to rape victims.36 While these laws are 
effective in assisting those rape victims who become pregnant and opt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Holmes, et al., supra note 6, at 322. 
30 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 829 (citing Amy Sobie & David C. Reardon, A 
Survey of Rape and Incest Pregnancies, in VICTIMS AND VICTORS: SPEAKING OUT 
ABOUT THEIR PREGNANCIES, ABORTIONS, AND CHILDREN RESULTING FROM 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 18, 19 (David C. Reardon, et al. eds., 2000)). 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 832-33. 
34 Id. at 842-43. 
35 Id.at 829. 
36 Id. 
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for abortion or adoption, these laws ultimately fall short of protecting 
women who choose to keep their child.37 
A. A Brief Note on Statutory Rape 
 This Comment centers on a discussion of forcible rape where 
the victim is over the age of eighteen. Pregnancies resulting from 
incidences of statutory rape result in their own set of legal quandaries, 
as demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit’s 1996 decision, Pena v. 
Mattox.38 In that case, a biological father was denied his parental 
rights because he was four years older than his then fifteen-year-old 
girlfriend when their child was conceived.39 A substantial amount of 
controversy surrounds this decision. It has often been viewed as 
exceedingly harsh, particularly since courts have refused to terminate 
parental rights in cases where a parent was convicted of murder, an 
arguably worse crime than statutory rape.40 Along the same lines, the 
termination of parental rights in statutory rape cases must be viewed 
under a different lens than the termination of parental rights in 
forcible rape cases since statutory rape is commonly perceived as a 
less serious crime.41 
 Another problem affecting parental rights in statutory rape 
cases is the fact that statutory rape is a strict liability offense;42 thus, a 
person may commit statutory rape without even being aware that he 
or she was committing a crime.43 As such, the analysis regarding the 
termination of a statutory rapist father’s rights differs from a forcible 
rapist father’s because in many cases the statutory rapist “does not 
even fit the composite of a criminal who should not profit from his 
wrong. Therefore, application of the maxim that a criminal should not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id.  
38 84 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1996). 
39 Id. at 900. 
40 Angela D. Lucchese, Notes: Pena v. Mattox: The Parental Rights of a 
Statutory Rapist, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 285, 295-96 (1998). 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 285. 
43 Id. 
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profit from his crime would be illogical, because the criminal did not 
intend the wrong.”44 The circumstances in some statutory rape cases 
may, of course, be more analogous to forcible rape. However, since in 
many statutory rape cases the offender does not have the intent to 
commit a crime, the analysis for statutory rape cases must be viewed 
separately from forcible rape cases. As such, the termination of 
parental rights in cases of statutory rape is outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
B. The Scope of Parental Rights in the United States 
 If a rapist father is granted parental rights to a child conceived 
through rape, he receives a significant amount of control over both the 
victim mother and the child. In the United States, parental rights allow 
a biological parent a significant amount of control over both their 
child and their co-parent.45 There are four primary forms of parental 
rights in the United States: physical custody, legal custody, visitation, 
and consent to adoption.46  
 Physical custody allows a parent to actively participate in the 
child’s life and upbringing by providing direct care to the child.47 
Physical custody can be shared between the two parents.48 Legal 
custody allows a parent who does not provide direct care to the child 
to have a legally enforceable say in all parenting decisions made by 
the parent with physical custody,49 such as where the child lives, 
where the child attends school, and the child’s religious upbringing.50 
Visitation allows a parent without physical custody to have scheduled 
times to visit a child.51 Visitation rights are overseen by courts, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Id. at 300.  
45 See Bitar, supra note 15, at 276-77. 
46 See id. at 277. 
47 See McCarty v. McCarty, 807 A.2d 1211, 1213-14 (2002).  
48 See id.  
49 See id. 
50 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 836.  
51 Bitar, supra note 15, at 277. 
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tend to protect a parent’s visitation rights. 52  Finally, consent to 
adoption requires that a biological parent be given the opportunity to 
approve of an adoption of his or her biological child before it is 
finalized.53  
 These forms of parental rights, particularly physical custody, 
legal custody, and visitation, allow a parent to exert a significant level 
of control over a co-parent.54 Consequently, rapist fathers who seek to 
enforce their parental rights are able to exert a significant level of 
control over their victims.55 The rapist father has control over where 
the victim mother lives, how the victim mother raises her child, and 
the victim mother’s schedule.56 The victim mother must also contact 
and see her rapist when dropping off or picking up the child or 
discussing parenting decisions.57 While in some cases direct contact 
between the victim and her attacker may be able to be avoided 
through the use of family members or other agents who could 
facilitate transporting the child between the two parents, the attacker 
would still have significant control over parenting decisions.58 Thus, 
even if the victim does not have to face her attacker directly, she still 
must deal with the control he exerts over her life as well as the fact 
that her child is spending time with her attacker.59 Even without direct 
contact between the victim and her attacker, this prolonged contact 
and continued exertion of control by their rapists may have a seriously 
damaging effect on victim mothers as they attempt to recover from 
their rapes.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 277-78. 
54 See id. at 276-78. 
55 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 831. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 831-32. 
60 Id. at 832-34. 
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C. The Effect on Rape Victims of Prolonged Contact with their 
Attackers 
“During my final year of college, I experienced an event that 
was so absolute in its effects that, since it occurred, it has figured as 
the point of reference from which all understandings and meanings of 
my life now stem: I was raped.”61 This is how one rape victim 
described the effect of her rape on her psychological state.62 Aside 
from the physical harm perpetrated during an incidence of rape, these 
attacks, more often than not, also have a severe psychological impact 
on the victim.63  
Rape victims are likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”) and rape-related post-traumatic stress disorder 
following their rapes.64 One study found that 94% of rape victims 
suffer from rape-related post-traumatic stress disorder in the period 
immediately following the attack. 65  According to the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), PTSD sufferers experience “symptoms 
of distress.”66 They also “may become emotionally numb . . . lose 
interest in things they used to enjoy . . . startle easily or be irritable, 
[or] become aggressive.”67  Other studies found that rape victims 
suffer from “disturbances in general functioning. . . .” 68  Such 
disturbances may include “a general withdrawal from the outside 
world.”69 The NIH report also noted, “PTSD symptoms seem to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Prewitt, supra note 1. 
62 See id. 
63 Christopher C. Kendall, Rape as a Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering 
Activity, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 91, 102 (2010). 
64 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 833-34. 
65 Edna B. Foa, et al., Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Rape 
Victims: A Comparison Between Cognitive-Behavioral Procedures and Counseling, 
59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 715, 715 (1991). 
66 NIH & the Friends of the Nat’l Library of Medicine, PTSD: A Growing 




68 Kendall, supra note 63, at 108. 
69 Id. 
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worse if they were triggered deliberately by another person, as in a 
mugging or rape.”70  
For most rape victims, these symptoms begin to abate in the 
months following the attack.71 A recent study found that three months 
after the attack, the percentage of rape victims still found to be 
suffering from rape-related post-traumatic stress disorder dropped 
from 94% to 47%.72 Most rape victims will “sufficiently recover” 
within a year of the attack.73  
Rape victims who press charges against their attackers, however, 
have been shown to have slower recoveries.74 Repeated contact with 
their attackers and lengthy court proceedings delay their ability to 
move past the rape.75 Many of these women “may not begin the 
recovery process until after the trial is concluded.”76 A victim that 
must continue to interact with a rapist father who chooses to exercises 
his parental rights will face a similar delay in her recovery process 
and will be subject to exacerbated symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder or rape-related post traumatic stress disorder.77   
Victim mothers whose rapists have sought to exercise their 
parental rights have expressed the psychological effects resulting 
from prolonged contact with their rapists.78 One victim mother stated: 
I was raped in [North Carolina] and the rapist won 
“[j]oint” custody. Torment does not come close to 
describe what I live. . . . [The courts] have not only 
tied and bound me to a rapist, but also the innocent 
child that was conceived by VIOLENCE! [The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 NIH, supra note 66. 
71 Foa, supra note 65, at 715. 
72 Id. 
73 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 833 (citing SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, 






78 Id. at 831. 
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rapist’s] violence has earned him even more control 
over my life.79  
In addition to being psychologically damaging to the victim, the 
presence of these PTSD symptoms also affect the victim mother’s 
ability to effectively parent. The “domino effect” demonstrates that 
allowing a rapist father to assert his parental rights is not in the best 
interests of the child. 
Some rapist fathers have used the existence of their parental 
rights to manipulate and blackmail their victims.80 For example, rapist 
fathers convince their victims to not press charges in return for the 
rapist father’s agreement not to exercise his parental rights.81 This too 
may have a damaging effect on the victim mother’s recovery from the 
rape as she is not able to see justice served and her attacker punished. 
Continued contact with their rapists is seriously damaging to 
rape victims who become pregnant and keep their babies. Women 
need the protection of legislation designed to terminate their rapists’ 
parental rights. 
II. CURRENT LEGISLATION IS INEFFECTIVE IN PROTECTING VICTIM 
MOTHERS 
A. Cases Regarding the Termination of Parental Rights 
There is a limited amount of case law related to the issue of 
terminating or restricting the parental rights of rapist fathers. The 
existing cases, however, demonstrate the differing approaches in 
states with legislation designed to protect victim mothers and those 
states with no such legislation. 
In Hilliker v. Miller, the plaintiff victim mother sought to 
prevent her rapist from receiving parenting time because their “child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Posting of Not avail. to RoguePundit: 
Rapists’ Rights Over Their Children, http://roguepundit.type-
pad.com/roguepundit/2004/10/rapists_rights_. html (Nov. 28, 2004)). 
80 Id. at 835. 
81 Id.at 836. 
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was conceived through a nonconsensual sexual act.”82 The court held 
that “[e]ven given the circumstances surrounding the child’s 
conception, there is adequate evidence to permit the district court’s 
ultimate finding that liberal visitation is in the best interests of the 
child.”83 The court reached this conclusion despite the plaintiff victim 
mother’s assertion that “the child’s best interests are not served by 
granting parenting time to appellant because of the circumstances of 
the conception and the risks to the child’s identity, stability, and 
development. . . .”84  
Following this decision, the victim mother was forced to come 
in contact with her attacker several times a week when dropping off 
or picking up her child, as well as at her child’s school and sporting 
activities.85 In a later interview, the victim mother expressed the ill 
effects of this continued contact with her rapist, stating, “I . . . 
struggle to move on with my life and I wonder how . . . to do so when 
I have to see this man every other day. . . . Our system needs to be 
revamped but I need help now. . . .”86 In this case, the prolonged 
contact with the rapist father caused by the court’s refusal to limit his 
parental rights clearly had a significant and negative effect on the 
victim mother.87 
Hilliker was decided in Minnesota. Minnesota does not have 
legislation designed to restrict or terminate the parental rights of rapist 
fathers.88 Consequently, the decision against the victim mother was 
inevitable. Conversely, in states with legislation aimed at terminating 
the parental rights of rapist fathers, cases come out more favorably for 
victim mothers.89  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Hilliker v. Miller, No. A05-1538, 2006 WL 1229633, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 9, 2006). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Prewitt, supra note 9, at 832. 
86 Id. (citation omitted).  
87 See id. at 832-33. 
88 See id. 
89 See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.A.T., 273 P.3d 813, 819-21 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2012). 
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Kansas has a statute that states: “[T]he court may order that 
parental rights be terminated, upon a finding by clear and convincing 
evidence . . . the birth of the child was the result of the rape of the 
mother.”90 In In re Adoption of C.A.T., the court applied this statute to 
terminate the rapist father’s parental rights after the victim mother 
showed he raped her, resulting in conception.91 In stark contrast to the 
Minnesota case, the court succinctly and efficiently terminated the 
rapist father’s parental rights upon a showing that he raped the victim 
mother:  
Under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(f), the 
consent of a natural father to an adoption is not 
required if it is found by clear and convincing evidence 
that the child was conceived as a result of rape. Here, 
the district court heard testimony from several 
witnesses regarding the circumstances surrounding the 
conceptions of [the victim mother’s two children]. 
Ultimately, the district court found the testimony of 
[the victim and two third party witnesses] to be more 
credible than that of [the rapist father], and we cannot 
replace our judgment for that of the district court 
regarding questions of fact.92  
The existence of legislation in Kansas prevented this victim mother 
from having to endure the “struggle to move on with [her] life”93 
experienced by victim mothers whose rapists successfully exercise 
their parental rights. 
The disparity in outcomes between these two cases demonstrates 
the necessity of legislation to protect these victim mothers. 
Unfortunately, such legislation does not exist in most states. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2136(h)(1)(F) (2005). 
91  273 P.3d at 819-21. 
92 Id. at 819. 
93 See Prewitt, supra note 9, at 832. 
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B. The Current State of Legislation 
Currently, forty states have some form of legislation aimed at 
limiting the parental rights of rapists.94 Many state laws allow for a 
streamlined adoption process for rape victims by waiving the 
requirement that the rapist approve the adoption before it can be 
finalized, through explicit wording or termination of all parental 
rights. 95  Thirty-four states have passed laws designed for this 
purpose.96  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See Alaska Stat. § 25.23.180(c)(3) (2010); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-121 (Westlaw 
2013); Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b) (West 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-105.5 (West 
Supp. 2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45(a)-717(g)(2)(G) (West 2004); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 13, § 724A(e) (2013); Fla. Stat. § 39.806(1)(m) (2013); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
571-61(b)(5) (2013); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-2005(2)(a) (2009); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 50/8 (1993); Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(4) (2005); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-
2136(h)(1)(F) (2005); Iowa Code § 606A.6(1) (2011); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 137 
(2012); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 1658 (1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 
722.25(2) (West 2011); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.447.5(5) (West 2011); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 41-3-609(1)(c) (2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-104.15 (LexisNexis 2011); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125C.210 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4.1(a) 
(West 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C:5(VII)(d) (2012); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
32A-5-19 (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111-a (McKinny 2010); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-27.3(c) (West 2010); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.07(F) 
(West 2011); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A § 1-4-904(B)(11) (West 2009); Or. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 419B.502 (West 2011); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511(a)(7) (West 2010); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-320(3) (2008); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-6-4(6A) (2011); 
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c), (g)(10) (2010); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.007 
(Vernon 2007); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-111 (2008); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 
665(f)(1) (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1233(6) (2007); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
26.33.170(2)(b) (West 2005); W. Va. Code § 48-9-209a (2014); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
48.415(9) (West 2009); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.42 (West 2009); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-
22-110(a)(viii) (2011). 
95 See Prewitt, supra note 9, at 829. 
96 See Alaska Stat. § 25.23.180(c)(3); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-121 (Westlaw 
2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-105.5 (2013); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45(a)-
717(g)(2)(G); Fla. Stat. § 39.806(1)(m) (2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-61(b)(5) 
(2013); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-2005(2)(a); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 50/8; Ind. Code 
§ 31-19-9-8(a)(4); Iowa Code § 606A.6(1) (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-
2136(h)(1)(F); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 1658; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.447.5(5); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 41--3-609(1)(c); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-104.15; N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 32A-5-19; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111-a; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-
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Alaska’s statute limiting a rapist father’s right to approve of an 
adoption states:  
The rights of a parent with reference to a child, 
including parental right to control the child or to 
withhold consent to an adoption, may be relinquished 
and the relationship of parent and child terminated in 
or before an adoption proceeding. . . . The relationship 
of parent and child may be terminated by a court order 
issued in connection with a proceeding . . . that the 
parent committed an act constituting sexual assault . . . 
under the laws of this state or a comparable offense 
under the laws of the state where the act occurred that 
resulted in conception of the child and that termination 
of the parental rights of the biological parent is in the 
best interests of the child.97  
This statute allows the victim mother to place her baby up for 
adoption without the rapist father’s consent so long as she can show 
that the child was conceived through rape and that the adoption is in 
the best interests of the child.98 This effectively prevents the rapist 
father from exercising control over the victim mother by refusing to 
consent to the adoption. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27.2(c)-14-27.3(c); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C:5(VII)(d) (2012); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 3107.07(F); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A § 1-4-904(B)(11); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 419B.502; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511(a)(7); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-320(3); 
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-6-4(6A); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c), (g)(10); Tex. 
Fam. Code Ann. § 161.007; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-111; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 
665(f)(1) (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1233(6); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
26.33.170(2)(b); W. Va. Code § 48-9-209a (2014); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.415(9); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(viii). 
97 Alaska Stat. § 25.23.180(a)-(c). 
98 Id. 
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In other states, laws restrict a rapist father’s parental rights to 
varying degrees—denying him visitation alone, 99  denying him 
visitation and custody,100 terminating his rights if he is convicted of 
rape,101 or, in a small number of states, terminating his rights without 
a conviction of rape.102  
Three states, Delaware, South Dakota, and Louisiana, have laws 
that limit a rapist father’s visitation rights.103 The Louisiana Civil 
Code provides:  
In a proceeding in which visitation of a child is being 
sought by a natural parent, if the child was conceived 
through the commission of a felony rape, the natural 
parent who committed the felony rape shall be denied 
visitation rights and contact with the child.104  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Three states—Delaware, Louisiana, and South Dakota—have legislation designed 
to restrict visitation alone. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 724A(e) (2013); La. Civ. 
Code Ann. art. 137 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4A-20. 
100 Four states—California, Michigan, Nevada, and New Jersey—have 
legislation designed to restrict visitation and custody. See Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b) 
(West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 722.25(2), 722.27(a)(4) (West 2011); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125C.210 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4.1(a) (West 
2002). 
101 Eight states—Connecticut, Maine, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas—have legislation designed to terminate parental 
rights if the father is convicted of rape. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45(a)-
717(g)(2)(G) (West 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 1658 (1997); Mo. Ann. 
Stat. § 211.447.5(5) (West 2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-609(1)(c) (2011); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-27.2(c)-14.27.3(c) (West 2010); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.502 
(2011), amended by Act effective Jan. 1, 2012, ch. 438, 2011 Or. Laws, available at 
www. leg.stat.or.us/11orlaws/sess0400.dir/0438.pdf; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-
113(c), (g)(10) (2010); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.007 (Vernon 2002). 
102 Five states—Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—have 
legislation designed to terminate parental rights without a conviction for rape. See 
Idaho Code Ann. § 16-2005(2)(a); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A § 1-4-904(B)(11) (West 
2009); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.42. 
103 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 724A(e) (2013); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 137 
(2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4A-20. 
104 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 137 (2012). 
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Similarly, South Dakota’s law states: “If it is in the best interest of the 
child, the court may prohibit, revoke, or restrict visitation rights to a 
child for any person who has caused the child to be conceived as the 
result of rape or incest.”105 These laws provide a limited amount of 
protection to victim mothers by allowing them to bar their rapists 
from seeking visitation. However, the laws in these states only restrict 
a rapist father’s rights with respect to visitation.106 Since legislation in 
these states only involves visitation and makes no mention of the 
issue of custody, rapist fathers in these states are still able to seek 
custody of the child.107  
Four states—California, Michigan, Nevada, and New Jersey—
have laws that limit both a rapist father’s visitation and custody 
rights.108 For example, the California Family Code provides: “No 
person shall be granted custody of, or visitation with, a child if the 
person has been convicted under [California’s criminal rape statute] 
and the child was conceived as a result of that violation.”109 In all four 
states, the application of these laws is contingent upon the rapist 
father’s being prosecuted and convicted of the rape.110 Additionally, 
these laws do not waive the rapist father’s right to approve of an 
adoption. 
Fifteen states—Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia—have laws that allow for 
the termination of all of a rapist’s parental rights.111 For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4A-20. 
106 Bitar, supra note 15, at 288-89. 
107 Id. 
108 Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b) (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 
722.25(2), 722.27(a)(4)(West 2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125C.210 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4.1(a) (West 2002). 
109 Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b) (West 2004). 
110 See Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b) (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 
722.25(2), 722.27(a)(4) (West 2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125C.210 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4.1(a) (West 2002). 
111 See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-121 (Westlaw 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-105.5 
(2013); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45(a)-717(g)(2)(G) (West 2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
571-61(b)(5) (2013): Iowa Code § 606A.6(1) (2011); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A 
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Maine’s law states: “The parental rights and responsibilities with 
respect to a specific child of a parent convicted of a crime involving 
the sexual intercourse that resulted in the conception of that child may 
be terminated in accordance with this section.”112 As with the states 
that allow a father’s custody and visitation rights to be restricted, 
termination of parental rights in these states is contingent upon the 
rapist pleading guilty or being convicted of the rape.113 
Six states—Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin—allow a rapist father’s rights to be terminated without 
a conviction of rape.114 Oklahoma’s statute, for instance, states: “The 
court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child based upon the 
following legal grounds: . . . a finding that the child was conceived as 
a result of rape perpetrated by the parent whose rights are sought to be 
terminated.”115 A similar statute in Wisconsin provides that parental 
rights can be terminated “by proving that the child was conceived as a 
result of a sexual assault” which “may be proved by final judgment of 
conviction or other evidence produced at a fact-finding hearing.”116 
In these states, the victim mother must simply prove at trial that 
the rape occurred and resulted in the conception of the child in order 
to move to terminate the rapist father’s parental rights. Thus, these 
laws provide the highest level of protection to victim mothers. Since a 
higher evidentiary standard is required in criminal rape proceedings, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§ 1658 (1997); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.447.5(5) (West 2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-
3-609(1)(c) (2011); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C:5(VII)(d) (2012); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 14-27.2(c)-14-27.3(c) (West 2010); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.502 (2011), 
amended by Act effective Jan. 1, 2012, ch. 438, 2011 Or. Laws, available at 
www.leg.state.or.us/1lorlaws/sess0400.dir/0438.pdf; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-
113(c), (g)(10) (2010); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.007 (Vernon 2002); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 15 § 665(f)(1) (2013); W. Va. Code § 48-9-209a (2014). 
112 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 1658 (1997). 
113 Id. 
114 See Fla. Stat. § 39.806(1)(m) (2007); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-2005(2)(a)(2009); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2136(h)(1)(F)(2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A § 1-4-
904(B)(11) (West 2009); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511(a)(7) (West 2010); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 48.415(9)(b)(West 2009). 
115 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A § 1-4-904(B)(11). 
116 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.415(9)(b). 
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these laws allow victim mothers to seek protection even if there is not 
sufficient evidence to prove that the rape occurred beyond a 
reasonable doubt.117 
C. Problems with Existing Legislation 
While the existing laws aid in protecting a victim mother from 
her rapist, they are riddled with shortcomings that prevent the laws 
from being as effective as possible. In particular, the requirement of a 
conviction is a major impediment to laws that are designed to restrict 
a rapist’s parental rights.118 Rape is one of the most underreported 
violent crimes perpetrated in the United States. 119  In a study 
conducted by the National Institute of Justice, only 19.1% of raped 
women over the age of eighteen reported their rape to police.120 This 
same report also found that of reported rapes, only 37% resulted in a 
criminal prosecution.121 Of those prosecuted, only 46.2% resulted in a 
conviction.122 Additionally, a survey of rape victims indicated that 
only 7.8% reported that their rapists were criminally prosecuted and a 
mere 3.3% reported that their rapists were ultimately convicted.123 
Another study found that 10% of rapes were reported and 20% of 
those resulted in convictions.124 These numbers would indicate that 
98% of rapists are never convicted for their crimes.125 Thus, not only 
are instances of rape considerably underreported, the rate of 
prosecution among reported rapes is low, and the majority of 
prosecuted rapes do not result in convictions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 See Bitar, supra note 15, at 293. 
118 Id. at 292. 
119 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
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There are several reasons for this low level of convictions in 
tried cases, but the primary problems are evidentiary in nature. In 
many rape cases, it is difficult for a prosecutor to present enough 
evidence to support a jury finding that the rape occurred beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In date rape cases, for instance, there is often little 
evidence that can be presented to prove that the rape occurred.126 If a 
sperm sample is collected, it does not prove that the intercourse was 
forced.127 A urine sample would prove the presence of the date rape 
drug in the victim’s system, but many victims are unaware “of the 
necessity to obtain a urine sample quickly” after the attack.128 The best 
evidence in such cases would be the victim’s recollection of the attack. 
However, date rape victims often have no memory of what occurred 
while under the influence of date rape drugs.129 Furthermore, there are 
often no witnesses to the attack.130 These evidentiary issues contribute 
to the low level of convictions in criminal cases that go to trial. This, 
combined with the low number of criminal charges, results in an 
exceedingly small number of rapes ultimately ending in convictions. 
Therefore, in states where a conviction is required to limit a 
rapist’s parental rights, these laws designed to protect rape victims 
from prolonged contact with their attackers provide little or no actual 
protection. Since so few rape victims see their attackers convicted, 
only a marginal number of women experience the protection offered 
by these laws.  
Accordingly, in order to be most effective, legislation aimed at 
restricting the parental rights of rapists should not require a criminal 
conviction; instead, the victim should only be required to prove that 
the rape occurred through clear and convincing evidence in civil court. 
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D. Why Is Legislation Restricting the Parental Rights of Rapists 
Largely Absent in the United States? 
As stated previously, it has been suggested that the absence of 
legislation aimed at protecting pregnant rape victims from their 
attackers is based on incorrect assumptions and social attitudes about 
rape.131 Shauna Prewitt, a woman who got pregnant from rape,132 sets 
forth the idea of a “pregnant-raped woman prototype.”133 She argues 
that there persists throughout American society the idea that a woman 
who becomes pregnant through rape will automatically hate her baby 
as an ever-present reminder of her rape and her rapist.134 Due to this 
assumption, society and, as a result, many legislatures, come to the 
conclusion that a pregnant woman will automatically choose either 
abortion or adoption. 135  However, as discussed previously, a 
significant portion of women who become pregnant through rape 
decide to keep their babies.  
Prewitt argues that women who chose to keep their babies break 
with the “pregnant-raped woman prototype” and are thus “viewed 
with suspicion.”136 She compares these assumptions regarding the 
choices of pregnant rape victims to other common misconceptions 
about rape, most notably the idea that most rapes are committed by a 
“black stranger attacking a white woman in public using 
overwhelming force.”137 In reality, almost 80% of rapes are not 
committed by strangers to the victim.138 Additionally, almost 60% of 
rapes occur in the victim’s home or the home of someone the victim 
knows. 139  Prewitt argues that these disparities between common 
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understandings of rape and the realities of rape result in legislation 
that provides ineffective protection to rape victims.140 
III. LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO RESTRICT THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF 
RAPISTS MUST BE CRAFTED TO AVOID DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES 
Legislation designed to restrict the parental rights of rapists is 
necessary to protect the welfare of rape victims and serve the best 
interests of children conceived in rape. Such legislation, however, 
faces the possibility of due process challenges because it is aimed at 
limiting rapists’ constitutionally protected right to a family.141 Thus, 
legislatures must be careful in designing statutes in order to avoid 
such challenges by first requiring that the victim prove through clear 
and convincing evidence that the rape occurred and resulted in 
conception. As such, legislation aimed at limiting or wholly excising 
the rights of a rapist father must include a provision that requires a 
showing that the rapist father’s involvement in the child’s life is 
adverse to the welfare of the victim mother and to the best interests of 
the child. 
Since the foundational basis for restricting the rapist father’s 
parental rights is the fact that he raped the mother victim, establishing 
that the rape did indeed occur is a necessary first step in restricting his 
rights within the bounds of the constitution. The fact of the rape, must 
be proven to the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that “freedom of personal choice in matters of family life 
is a fundamental liberty interest”142 and thus, in order to satisfy due 
process, any law seeking to restrict parental rights must be proven 
through clear and convincing evidence.143 Currently, only one state, 
Kansas, explicitly states that this is the applicable standard in its law 
designed to restrict the parental rights of rapist fathers.144 
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The above-mentioned Kansas case, In re Adoption of C.A.T., 
demonstrates how the clear and convincing evidence standard 
operates in cases where a victim mother seeks to restrict the parental 
rights of a rapist father: 
Here, [a third party witness] testified that on the night 
of [the child’s] conception, she heard A.S.[the mother 
victim] telling J.R. [the rapist father] “no, no, no” and 
“stop” from behind the locked bathroom door. This 
evidence supports a finding that A.S. did not consent to 
having sex with J.R. There is also evidence in the 
record that A.S. was under the influence at the time of 
the sexual encounter that resulted in [the child’s] 
conception and that A.S. was therefore incapable of 
giving her consent. In fact, A.S. testified that it was not 
until a paternity test conclusively established that J.R. 
was the father of [the child] that she realized that she 
had been raped. Furthermore, [another third party 
witness] testified that J.R. later admitted to him that he 
had raped A.S. in the bathroom. This testimony alone, 
if believed, is clear and convincing evidence that [the 
child] was conceived as a result of rape. Thus, we find 
substantial evidence in the record upon which a 
rational factfinder could find it highly probable that 
[the child’s] conception was the result of rape. . . .145 
 In this case, the victim mother was able to satisfy the clear and 
convincing evidence standard through her own testimony and the 
testimony of several witnesses who could corroborate her claim that 
her child was conceived through rape. By requiring this showing and 
using this intermediate standard of evidence, the legislation will 
effectively strike a balance between protecting the interests of both 
the rapist father and victim mother. The rapist father’s rights will be 
protected because the victim mother will be required to prove that the 
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rape occurred before he can be stripped of his rights. The victim 
mother can more easily obtain protection since she will not have to 
wait on a conviction that may or may not happen to receive the 
benefits of the legislation. 
 Explicitly establishing this evidentiary standard will also assist 
in assuaging potential legislative fears about allowing a rapist father’s 
rights to be restricted without also requiring a conviction for sexual 
assault. Despite the absence of a conviction, the mother victim would 
nonetheless have to establish that the rape did in fact occur to an 
intermediate standard of evidence. As courts have noted, “‘[c]lear and 
convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability . . . that 
the evidence be ‘so clear as to leave no substantial doubt’; 
‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every 
reasonable mind.’”146 While certainly not equal to the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction and 
subsequent incarceration, this standard sufficiently establishes that the 
rape occurred in order to satisfy due process with regard to restricting 
the rapist father’s parental rights. 
This standard of proof, in conjunction with the absence of a 
requirement for a criminal conviction, will also allow more victim 
mothers to benefit from laws designed to protect them and their 
children. As noted previously, an alarmingly small number of rapes 
are reported, even fewer are prosecuted, and an even smaller number 
ultimately result in convictions.147 By not requiring a conviction, a 
victim mother who do not wish to go through the ordeal of pressing 
charges and enduring a criminal trial may nonetheless seek protection 
in civil court by blocking her attacker from claiming his parental 
rights. Additionally, those victim mothers who do press charges or 
whose attackers are not ultimately convicted under the more stringent 
criminal evidentiary standard will still be able to seek protection in 
civil court. Thus, the clear and convincing evidence standard not only 
fulfills a threshold due process issue before the rapist father’s rights 
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can be restricted, but also assists in achieving a balance between the 
rights of the rapist father and victim mother by allowing the victim to 
prove that the rape occurred to a lower, but still intermediate, 
evidentiary standard. 
Proving through clear and convincing evidence that the rape 
occurred, however, alone may still be insufficient to wholly satisfy 
due process. Courts are split on whether or not a felony conviction is 
sufficient to restrict parental rights.148 Thus, they would likely split on 
whether proving rape by clear and convincing evidence would be 
sufficient for the same purpose. Even courts within the same 
jurisdiction may differ on this issue. In California, for instance, a state 
appellate court held that a mother’s felony conviction for torture and 
sexual offenses committed against her lover’s ex-wife was 
insufficient to justify restricting her parental rights.149 Conversely, in 
another California appellate court decision, the court held that a 
father’s felony conviction for stabbing his children’s mother was 
sufficient to terminate his parental rights.150  
Of course, the major difference between these two cases is that 
one felony was perpetrated against the mother whereas the other 
crime was perpetrated against someone outside the family unit. It has 
been noted, however, that “[t]he commission of the felony need not 
include the participation of the children, nor does it have to be 
completed in their presence. The circumstances need only be those 
which, in the trial court’s discretion, prove the unfitness of the 
parent.”151 Thus, the primary concern is the nature of the crime and its 
relation to the parenting of the child as opposed to the party against 
whom the crime was perpetrated.  
Although courts appear to be conflicted on this issue, 
jurisprudence clearly indicates that a showing beyond the fact of a 
felony conviction or proof of a crime through clear and convincing 
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evidence is necessary in order to satisfy due process. In an American 
Law Reports article, Wanda Ellen Wakefield states: 
[I]t has been held to be inconsistent with due process 
protection to provide for the termination of parental 
rights without requiring the proof of a potential 
substantial harm to the child should it remain with its 
parents, or without affording a hearing, on the question 
of the fitness to continue to care for their child, of the 
parents whose rights were sought to be terminated.152  
Thus it may be necessary for legislation that seeks to restrict a rapist’s 
parental rights to require a showing that the rapist father would pose 
harm to the child. 
Additionally, Wakefield writes, “[i]n order to satisfy due 
process guaranties, it has been held that any fact presumed in a statute 
providing for the termination of parental rights, such as a presumption 
that a parent is unfit if he or she is incarcerated, must bear a 
substantial relationship to the fact shown. . . .”153 Thus, in legislation 
that seeks to restrict the parental rights of rapist fathers, it must be 
shown that the fact that the father raped the mother, resulting in 
conception of the child, is the reason behind restricting the rapist 
father’s rights. This should not be a difficult hurdle since it can easily 
be made clear in the text of the legislation. Additionally, a majority of 
courts have found that the presumptions in statutes attempting to 
terminate parental rights bear a sufficient relationship to the facts 
being proven.154  
Finally, Wakefield asserts, “a parent must be offered an 
opportunity to rebut any presumption contained in the statute by 
presenting his or her own evidence on the issue of fitness.”155 Thus, 
the rapist father must be given a chance at trial to demonstrate that 
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exercising his parental rights and involvement in the child’s life 
would not have a negative impact on the child. 
In relation to these contingencies, legislation that seeks to 
terminate the parental rights of rapists must also stand up to strict 
scrutiny. Courts in the United States are generally reluctant to restrict 
the parental rights of a biological parent. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a fundamental right to 
“bring up children.”156 Thus, courts determining the constitutionality 
of legislation designed to limit rapists’ parental rights will be required 
to apply strict scrutiny, the most stringent level of judicial review.157 
In order to overcome strict scrutiny, this legislation must serve a 
compelling state interest, 158  be narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest, 159  and be the least restrictive means for serving that 
interest.160 
In the case of legislation that seeks to restrict rapists’ parental 
rights, the primary hurdle will be to establish that the legislation 
serves a compelling state interest. The compelling state interest at 
hand is the welfare of the mother victim and the best interests of the 
child. Legislation can be narrowly tailored to serve these interests 
through explicit limitations on its application to cases where the father 
forcibly raped the mother resulting in pregnancy, accompanied by an 
explicit statement of what rights of the rapist father are affected.  
As for the least restrictive means standard, this too is fairly easy 
to overcome. If the compelling interest is proven (i.e., that the mother 
victim’s welfare and the best interests of the child are both damaged 
by the rapist father’s exercise of his parental rights), then restricting 
the rapist father’s parental rights is evidently the least restrictive 
means of correcting the problem. Other potential solutions for serving 
the state’s interests, for example, removing the child from the custody 
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of both parents and placing him or her in foster care, are clearly more 
burdensome.  
The standard requiring proof of a compelling state interest, 
however, may be a larger hurdle for this kind of legislation to clear. 
The state has an evident interest in preserving the welfare of the 
mother-victim and serving the best interests of the child, but in order 
for legislation that seeks to restrict the parental rights of rapist fathers 
to clear this hurdle, it must be demonstrated that this interest is 
compelling. 
The compelling nature of the state’s interest can be tied directly 
to the requirement of showing that a rapist father is unfit as a parent 
or would have a negative effect on the child. As noted above, the 
rapist father’s involvement can have a very serious psychological 
effect on the mother, slowing her recovery from rape and 
exacerbating her PTSD symptoms.161 She may suffer from symptoms 
of distress, emotional numbness, loss of interest, irritability, and 
aggression.162 These symptoms, in turn, affect the victim mother’s 
ability to effectively parent the child, resulting in a negative effect on 
the child.163  
The standard for showing the unfitness of the parent in cases of 
children conceived through rape can be based on existing standards 
for proving the unfitness of a parent. Again using California as an 
example, courts in that jurisdiction define unfitness as a “probability 
that the parent will fail in a substantial degree to discharge duties 
toward the child.”164 Other states, such as Illinois, have used a finding 
of parental “depravity” as a basis for a finding of the parent’s 
unfitness. 165  A finding of depravity can be based on a criminal 
conviction; in Illinois, for instance, a parent can be found to be 
depraved based on, among other crimes, a conviction for murder of a 
co-parent, murder of any child, or sexual assault of a child.166 
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The California definition of unfitness in combination with the 
use of a finding of depravity will serve as an adequate basis for a 
method of showing unfitness under legislation designed to restrict the 
parental rights of rapist fathers. The legislation should, however, 
make it clear that a finding of depravity can be based on a 
demonstration through clear and convincing evidence that the rape 
occurred even in the absence of a criminal conviction.167 Thus, if a 
court finds that a victim mother has proven through clear and 
convincing evidence that the rape occurred, resulting in the 
conception of the child, the court should subsequently find that the 
rapist father is depraved and his parental rights should therefore be 
terminated. Such a finding should be adequate to satisfy the 
requirements of due process since it demonstrates that the state has a 
compelling interest in barring the father from having contact with the 
family in order to serve the best interests of the child. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to commonly held assumptions, a substantial number 
of women who become pregnant through rape opt to keep their babies 
rather than choosing abortion or adoption.168 In most states, their 
rapists enjoy the same parental rights as any other biological parent.169 
Because of this, rapist fathers who seek to exercise their parental 
rights have the ability to exert a high level of control over their 
victims’ lives.170 While many states have legislation designed to make 
it easier for rape victims to obtain abortions or place their children up 
for adoption,171 very few states have legislation designed to protect 
women who choose instead to keep their babies.172 
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Due to the psychological damage that results from continued 
contact with their attackers, there is a need for legislation designed to 
protect these victim mothers and their children. The surest way to 
provide protection to these women is by allowing them to seek 
termination of the rapist father’s parental rights without first pressing 
criminal charges and getting a conviction, because an exceedingly 
small number of sexual assaults result in a criminal conviction.173 
Such legislation, however, faces the possibility of due process 
challenges since it seeks to restrict parental rights, which have been 
deemed a fundamental right.174  
In order to overcome such challenges, this legislation must first 
require the victim mother to prove that the rape occurred and resulted 
in conception of the child, pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer.175 Beyond this, the legislation 
must also stand up to strict scrutiny, which requires that it serve a 
compelling state interest,176 which in this case is the welfare of the 
victim mother and the best interests of the child. In order to fulfill this 
requirement, this legislation should require that the victim mother also 
show that the rapist father’s involvement in the child’s life is not in 
the best interests of the child because the father is unfit to parent, 
based on a finding of depravity since the father raped the victim 
mother. 
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